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 Background paper 
Public sector performance, 
prestige and promotion 
 
 
Introduction and summary of findings 
The technical appendix provides quantitative analysis that complements the text 
of the preceding parts of the report, with the key findings summarized in the executive 
summary. The analysis reported in this appendix consists entirely of linear multiple re-
gressions applied to cross-country data. This technique allows a researcher to estimate 
what can be interpreted as the independent effect of each variable on an outcome of in-
terest, controlling for the effects of all other relevant variables. What is actually measured, 
however, is the partial correlation between two variables, and correlation is not causation. 
Good design, along with a dose of common sense, is necessary if statistical tests are to 
yield useful, meaningful results as opposed to spurious, nonsensical correlations. The 
“outcomes” (dependent variables) of interest for the present report are presented in table 
1. 
Correlation is not causa-
tion 
 
Table 1. 
Dependent variables 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Description Source Years 
QUALITY1: ICRG 1984-1990 
QUALITY Skills of the bureaucracy 
QUALITY2: SCS 1990, 1999, 2002 
INTEGRITY1: ICRG 1984-1990 
INTEGRITY Level of corruption 
INTEGRITY2: SCS 1990, 1999, 2002 
PRESTIGE Attraction to university grads UNU/R&E 1970-1990 
PROMOTION 
Promotion of civil servants 
to senior political posts 
UNU/R&E 1970-1990 
 
The sources of data for the first four variables are surveys of expert opinion 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)1, the State Capacity Survey (SCS)2 
and a survey first carried out for 35 countries by Rauch and Evans3 and then extended by 
UNU4 to an additional 16 countries (UNU/R&E) (see “Survey questions and coding”). 
Of these 51 countries, a total of 45 are developing countries (23 in Africa, 9 in Asia and 
13 in Latin America and the Caribbean). All these data are analysed in cross sections 
rather than time series. This is dictated in part by the paucity of time-series data and 
partly by the fact that differences between countries are large while values change very 
slowly over time: inter-country variation is much greater than inter-temporal variation. 
The structural variables used to “explain” inter-country differences in outcomes are pre-
sented in table 2. 
Inter-country variation is 
much greater than inter-
temporal variation 
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 Table 2. 
Structural variables 
 
Structural variable Description Source Years 
CAREER 
Promotion procedures 
(profesional state bureaucracy) UNU/R&E 1970-1990 
MERIT 
Merit as criterion for hiring,
promotion and replacement SCS 
1990, 1999, 
2002 
SALARY Salaries relative to private sector UNU/R&E 1970-1990 
BRIBES Tips and bribes UNU/R&E 1970-1990 
EXAM Use of entrance examination UNU/R&E 1970-1990 
DEGREE University degree in lieu of exam UNU/R&E 1970-1990 
NPM New public management UNU/R&E 1970-1990 
 
Data for each of these variables, with the exception of MERIT, are from the 
unique UNU/R&E Survey. Surveys of a larger number of countries for later years pro-
vide useful data on outcomes but contain information only for MERIT: the extent to 
which a bureaucracy is run professionally rather than by a system of patronage. Data on 
size of the public sector and corresponding data on public sector wages are available for 
more than 60 countries, but there is little overlap with the 51 countries of the 
UNU/R&E Survey. In addition, the questions of the UNU/R&E Survey refer to the 
years 1970-1990 whereas the wage and employment data are for the years 1990-2003. 
 
In measuring the effect of structural variables on outcomes, it is very important 
to control for per capita income. Countries with high incomes tend to have a large pool 
of human capital, which usually implies a skilled and efficient civil service that rates high 
in integrity (less corruption) but pays low wages relative to those in the private sector 
because of the existence of a highly developed private sector. It also tends not to be very 
attractive – independent of wage levels – as a career choice for university graduates or as 
a pool of talent for appointment to senior political posts. The report looks at the effect 
of differences in structural variables on outcomes, holding per capita income constant 
and controlling also for the effects of other structural variables: 
It is important to control 
for income, when 
measuring the effect of 
different variables on 
outcome 
 
Career and merit 
Professionalism in the civil service – controlling for per capita income and other 
variables – is an excellent predictor of both the quality and the integrity (absence of cor-
ruption) of public service, and its effects are consistently positive. Somewhat surprisingly, 
however, it has no apparent effect on prestige of public service, on the probability that 
civil servants are selected for appointment to senior political posts or on average wages in 
the public sector. 
Professionalism predicts 
the quality and integrity 
of the public service 
 
Salary 
Legal remuneration (salary plus perquisites) of senior public officials relative to 
their counterparts in the private sector has some positive effect on bureaucratic quality 
and a much stronger positive effect on integrity. This variable also increases the prestige 
or attraction of a public sector career, but not in the 23 African countries surveyed. Sur-
Salaries have some 
effect on quality, and a 
much stronger effect on 
integrity 
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 prisingly, there is no significant association at all between legal remuneration of top civil 
servants and their success in securing promotion to high-level political office. 
 
Bribes 
The extra-legal remuneration (tips and bribes) of public officials is related nega-
tively to measures of integrity, but this is true by definition so it is a spurious correlation. 
More meaningful is the absence of any significant effect of this variable on the quality of 
bureaucracy in the public sector. For the 51-country sample as a whole, this variable has 
no significant effect on the prestige of public service, but splitting the sample into two 
groups reveals that the effect is absent only for the 23 African countries; for the remain-
ing 28 countries in the sample, the effect of tips and bribes on prestige is significant and 
negative. For promotion to senior political posts, the African/non-African dichotomy is 
even greater: the effect of extra-legal remuneration is negative, as expected, for the 28 
non-African countries, but it has no significant effect for the 23 African countries. This is 
a disturbing finding, for it implies that university graduates in African countries are indif-
ferent to the presence of opportunities to supplement their legal income with tips and 
bribes in public sector jobs. 
There is no significant 
correlation between 
bribes and public ser-
vice quality 
Graduates in Africa are 
indifferent to the pres-
ence of bribes 
 
Exam and degree 
Use of examinations for entrance into the civil service is not a very successful 
explanatory variable. There is weak evidence that entrance examinations have a positive 
impact on bureaucratic quality and much stronger evidence that they improve the prob-
ability that civil servants are selected for promotion to senior political posts. There is no 
evidence of any association between examinations and integrity or between examinations 
and the prestige of a civil service career. This poor result may be due to the fact that the 
design of the statistical test does not allow for the possibility of relying on university cre-
dentials in lieu of examinations to screen applicants. Information on the number of de-
gree holders among those who do not sit an entrance examination is available only for 
the original 35 countries surveyed by Rauch and Evans. When each of these variables 
(entrance examination and university degree) is entered separately in the “prestige” re-
gression for the 35 countries, neither is significant. In contrast, each variable is highly 
significant when both are entered simultaneously. The direction of their impact, however, 
is very different: positive for entrance examinations and negative for university degrees. 
This seems counter-intuitive at first glance, but it is possible that university graduates, 
other things being equal, might prefer to work in a bureaucracy that contains relatively 
few university educated persons, which makes their own training and credentials all the 
more valuable.  
There is weak evidence 
that entrance examina-
tions have a positive 
impact on the quality of 
the civil service 
 
New public management 
New public management (NPM) is measured indirectly as mobility of high-level 
personnel between the public and private sectors. This captures an important effect of 
NPM, which, by rewarding functions in the public sector in the same manner as they are 
rewarded in the private sector, stimulates movement back and forth between the two 
sectors. In contrast, the rewards and functions of senior officials in a traditional, career-
based civil service are very different from their counterparts in the private sector, with 
little consequent movement of personnel. This variable is not a significant determinant of 
quality or integrity of the civil service for the countries in the sample. It is, however, a 
NPM has a negative 
impact on the prestige 
of a public sector career 
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 significant determinant of the prestige of a public sector career, and its effect is negative, 
but weaker and less significant for African than for non-African countries. NPM also has 
a negative effect on the probability that civil servants are promoted to high political of-
fice, but this is true only for the non-African countries in the sample, not for the 23 Afri-
can countries, where the effect is essentially zero. 
NPM is not a significant 
determinant of the qual-
ity and integrity of the 
civil service 
 
 
Bureaucratic performance and structure 
In a seminal paper, Rauch and Evans5 found professionalism in the civil service 
(recruitment and promotion by merit rather than patronage) to be a statistically signifi-
cant determinant of bureaucratic performance. Because of the small size of their sample, 
they were unable to clearly establish the importance of other variables, such as salary lev-
els and career stability. As mentioned, the present report builds on this work by analysing 
data from the UNU expansion of the R&E survey from 35 to 51 countries and by look-
ing at other surveys that cover large numbers of countries but lack the rich detail of the 
unique UNU/R&E Survey. The statistical technique of linear multiple regression (ordi-
nary least squares) is used to measure the partial correlation of structural variables with 
two types of bureaucratic performance: quality of service and the integrity of public offi-
cials who provide that service.  
By focusing on the qual-
ity of public service and 
the integrity of public 
officials the impact of 
different variables is 
tested 
 
Measures of performance 
As measures of the performance of public sector bureaucracies, the report draws 
on ratings by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of “strength and expertise to 
govern” (QUALITY1) and corruption in government (INTEGRITY1). In addition, rat-
ings of the State Capacity Survey (SCS) for efficiency of the civil service (QUALITY2) 
and overall levels of corruption (INTEGRITY2) are used. These are coded in various 
ways, but a high score always indicates better performance (table 3). 
 
Table 3. 
Measures of bureaucratic performance 
 
Variable Indicator Score Coded Survey 
QUALITY1 
High scores indicate that the “bureaucracy 
has the strength and expertise to govern 
without drastic changes in policy or inter-
ruptions in government services”. 
.. 0-4 ICRG 
QUALITY2 
High scores indicate an efficient civil ser-
vice with excellent administrative and tech-
nical skills. 
Average score 
for questions 
13, 16 and 17 
0-10 SCS 
INTEGRITY1 
Low scores indicate “actual or potential 
corruption in the form of excessive patron-
age, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favour-
for-favours’, etc.”. 
.. 0-6 ICRG 
INTEGRITY2 
Low scores indicate high overall corruption 
within the state. 
Score for 
question 15 
0-10 SCS 
 
Note: Two dots (..) signify proprietary data. 
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 The two measures of performance (QUALITY and INTEGRITY) are correlated 
– a good performance in terms of efficiency tends to be accompanied by a good per-
formance in terms of low levels of corruption – but the correlation is far from perfect. 
This is clear from the scatter of QUALITY2 versus INTEGRITY2 displayed in scatter 
plot 1. 
Efficiency tends to be 
accompanied by low 
levels of corruption 
 
The scatter plot also contains a 
regression line with a constant term (in-
tercept) of 1.9 and slope equal to 0.7: 
QUALITY = 1.9 + 0.7 INTEGRITY. 
This is the straight line that minimizes 
the sum of the squared vertical distance 
of each observation from the line. Its 
positive slope indicates that the correla-
tion is positive, i.e., an increase in integ-
rity of officials is associated with an in-
crease in quality of service. More spe-
cifically, the regression line predicts that 
a very corrupt civil service, with an in-
tegrity score of zero, will have a quality 
rating of 1.9 and each point increase on 
the integrity index will, on average, in-
crease the quality rating by 0.7 points. 
(The two variables are measured on the 
same 0-10 scale.) 
Scatter plot 1. 
Quality and integrity 
 
 
 
Note: Plot of QUALITY2 against INTEGRITY2 
in 1999 (129 countries). 
 
The R-squared for this regression is 0.711, indicating in this instance that cross-
country variation in INTEGRITY “explains” 71.1 per cent of observed variation in 
QUALITY. With a perfect fit, all points would lie on the straight line and the R-squared 
would be equal to 1.00. The imperfection of the fit is obvious from examination of scat-
ter plot 1. Twenty-eight of the 129 government bureaucracies score zero in integrity; their 
quality of service ranges from zero to 5.3, with twelve exceeding the predicted QUAL-
ITY score of 1.9. At the other extreme, ten bureaucracies score the maximum 10 in in-
tegrity; their scores in quality of service range from 8.3 to 10. 
An increase in the integ-
rity of officials is associ-
ated with an increase in 
the quality of services 
 
Measures of structure 
Various measures of bureaucratic structure are listed in table 4 along with their 
median (mid-point in the distribution) score. 
 
CAREER is an index for professionalism devised by Rauch and Evans.6 A high 
score indicates that a country at the highest levels has a professional civil service rather 
than a system of political appointments and patronage. 
 
MERIT is an alternative rating by the SCS and is the only structural variable 
from a source other than the UNU/R&E Survey. MERIT differs from CAREER not 
only because the source is different but also because the score refers to professionalism 
in the hiring and promotion of civil servants in general, not just top officials. 
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 Table 4. 
Measures of bureaucratic structure 
 
Variable Indicator Score Coded Median Survey 
CAREER 
High values indicate a 
professional state bu-
reaucracy rather than a 
patronage system. 
Equal-weight in-
dex of questions 
6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 
each normalized 
to the 0-1 range.a 
0-1 0.47 
UNU/ 
R&E 
MERIT 
High scores indicate pro-
fessionalism rather than 
patronage (merit as a 
determinant). 
Score for question 
14 
0-10 1.67b SCS 
SALARY 
High scores indicate that 
legal remuneration of 
senior public officials is 
high compared to man-
agers in private sector 
with comparable training 
and responsibilities. 
Score for question 
14 
1-5 1.75 
UNU/ 
R&E  
BRIBES 
High scores reflect im-
portance of “bribes and 
other extra-legal perqui-
sites”. 
Score for question 
15 less question 
14 
0-4 0.67 
UNU/ 
R&E 
EXAM 
High scores indicate that 
many senior officials en-
ter the civil service via a 
formal examination sys-
tem. 
Score for question 
4 
1-4 2.0 
UNU/ 
R&E 
NPM 
High scores indicate that 
senior officials inter-
sperse private with pub-
lic sector careers. 
Average score, 
reversed, of ques-
tions 12 and 13c 
1-4 2.5 
UNU/ 
R&E 
 
Notes: 
a CAREER = [(4-Q6)/3 + (Q7-1)/2 +(Q8-1)/3 +(Q10-1)/3 + (Q11-1)]/5. 
b 45 countries. 
c NPM = (5-Q12+5-Q13)/2. 
 
SALARY is the response to question 14 of the UNU/R&E Survey and indicates 
the legal remuneration (base pay plus perquisites) of senior government officials com-
pared to managers in the private sector who have comparable training and responsibili-
ties. Country scores for this indicator range from 1 (less than 50 per cent of comparable 
private sector remuneration) to 5 (higher than private sector). The median response was 
1.75 and the simple average (mean) was 2.15, indicating that in the majority of countries 
surveyed, salaries and perquisites of senior public officials are far below those of their 
counterparts in the private sector. 
In the majority of coun-
tries surveyed, salaries 
and perquisites of sen-
ior public officials are 
far below those of their 
counterparts in the pri-
vate sector 
 
BRIBES is the score for question 15 (total remuneration of public officials com-
pared to private sector, including “bribes and other extra-legal perquisites”) less the score 
for question 14 (legal remuneration). This variable is an attempt to capture the quantita-
tive importance of extra-legal remuneration. A value of zero suggests little or no extra-
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 legal income, whereas higher values (up to 4) imply increasing importance of extra-legal 
tips and bribes relative to legal income. 
 
EXAM is taken directly from the Rauch and Evans survey question that asks 
what proportion of senior officials enters the civil service by examination. 
 
NPM is an attempt to capture the presence of “new public management” in a 
country’s civil service. Managers operating under the NPM model can be expected to 
move easily between the public and private sectors, since the work and rewards are much 
the same in the two types of employment. In a traditional, career-based civil service, there 
is little movement to and from the private sector. NPM measures mobility between the 
public and private sectors, so it is an indirect measure of new public management. 
The variable NPM is an 
attempt to capture the 
presence of “new public 
management” in a 
country’s civil service 
 
As noted earlier, all structural variables, with the exception of MERIT, are from 
the unique UNU/R&E Survey of 51 countries, 45 of which are developing countries (23 
from Africa, 9 from Asia and 13 from Latin America and the Caribbean). Respondents 
were asked to describe the bureaucracy of each country in the period 1970-1990. (For 
details, see annex.)The performance variables - QUALITY and INTEGRITY - are also 
the product of surveys of expert opinion but are more subjective. They cover the period 
from 1984 in the case of one source (ICRG) and from 1990 in the case of the other 
source (SCS). There are far more than 51 observations for the performance variables and 
for one of the structural variables (MERIT), but the regression analysis is limited to the 
common denominator of the variables for performance, structure and control, which can 
be as small as 44 observations (table 5). 
 
Table 5. 
Number of observations available for measures of bureaucratic performance 
and structure 
 
Variable Survey 
 1970-
1990 
 1984-
1990 
1990 1999 2002 
QUALITY1 ICRG .. 130 130 140 140 
QUALITY2 SCS .. .. 129 129 97 
INTEGRITY1 ICRG .. 130 130 140 140 
INTEGRITY2 SCS .. .. 129 129 97 
CAREER UNU/R&E 51 .. .. .. .. 
MERIT SCS .. .. 129 129 97 
SALARY UNU/R&E 51 .. .. .. .. 
BRIBES UNU/R&E 51 .. .. .. .. 
EXAM UNU/R&E 51 .. .. .. .. 
NPM UNU/R&E 51 .. .. .. .. 
 
Notes: The actual number of observations that can be used in regressions is often lower because of 
a missing control variable (GDPCAP) and because of incomplete overlap of country coverage. Two 
dots (..) signify no data. 
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 Control variables 
The analysis also looks at the effect of a particular variable on performance, con-
trolling for the effects of other variables. In other words, the focus is on partial rather 
than simple correlation. For bureaucratic performance, it is very important to control for 
per capita income. In the analysis reported here, the measure of income is per capita 
GDP at international prices (purchasing power parity). The natural logarithm is used 
rather than the raw figure because it provides a better fit to the data and because the im-
plicit assumption – that it is percentage rather than absolute changes in income that mat-
ters – seems reasonable (see scatter plots 2 and 3 for plots of QUALITY and INTEG-
RITY against the logarithm of per capita GDP for the year 1999).  
The analysis also looks 
at the effect of a particu-
lar variable on perform-
ance 
 
Scatter plot 2. 
Quality and GDPCAP 
 
 
 
Note: Plot of QUALITY2 against GDPCAP in 
1999 (121 countries). 
Scatter plot 3. 
Integrity and GDPCAP 
 
 
 
Note: Plot of INTEGRITY2 against GDPCAP in 
1999 (121 countries). 
 
In some regressions, dummy variables control for fixed regional effects: after ac-
counting for the effect of differences in per capita GDP and other variables, countries 
located in Africa, for example, might tend to have bureaucracies of higher (or lower) IN-
TEGRITY and QUALITY compared to countries in other regions of the world. 
 
Explanatory variables – structural as well as control variables – are retained in 
most cases only if the relevant regression coefficient differs significantly from zero at the 
90 per cent level of confidence. Using this level of confidence means that it is possible to 
accept a coefficient as significant when, as frequently as one time out of ten, there is in 
fact no systematic relationship between the explanatory variable and the dependent vari-
able. 
 
Determinants of bureaucratic quality 
Table 6 reports the results of regression analyses for the two measures of bu-
reaucratic quality, using data for the countries included in the UNU/R&E Survey. Since 
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 CAREER and MERIT are different measures of the same structural characteristic (pro-
fessionalism rather than patronage), they never enter a regression together. 
 
Table 6. 
Determinants of bureaucratic quality (UNU/R&E Survey) 
 
Dependent 
variable 
QUALITY1 
(1984-1990) 
QUALITY1 
(1984-1990) 
QUALITY2 
(1990) 
QUALITY2 
(1990) 
QUALITY2 
(1990) 
Intercept -3.208 -2.448 -10.524 -8.008 -7.363 
GDPCAP 0.550*** 0.509*** 1.460*** 1.161*** 1.119*** 
 (0.136) (0.166) (0.300) (0.264) (0.300) 
CAREER 1.680***  4.357***   
 (0.593)  (1.348)   
MERIT  0.159***  0.412*** 0.413*** 
  (0.058)  (0.090) (0.090) 
SALARY   0.588** 0.563*** 0.521** 
   (0.294) (0.208) (0.246) 
BRIBES     -0.085 
     (0.244) 
EXAM    0.419** 0.405** 
    (0.189) (0.174) 
NPM     -0.037 
     (0.361) 
Observations 50 44 45 45 45 
R-squared 0.342 0.416 0.494 0.646 0.647 
 
Note: GDPCAP is log of GDP per capita (PPP) in 1980. 
 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. 
 
*** = significantly different from zero at the 99 per cent level of confidence 
** = significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent level of confidence 
 
The coefficient of the control variable, GDPCAP, is positive and highly signifi-
cant in each equation. Its size indicates that, holding other variables constant, a doubling 
of per capita income, from, say, $1,000 to $2,000, or from $5,000 to $10,000, increases 
QUALITY1 by more than a third of a point on a five-point scale. Similarly, a doubling of 
per capita income increases QUALITY2 by as much as a full point on an eleven-point 
scale. (Since GDPCAP is measured in natural logarithms, its coefficient must be multi-
plied by 0.693, the logarithm of 2, to find the effect of a doubling of income.) None of 
the regional dummies were significant in any regression, so they are not included in the 
regression equations. 
GDP per capita is posi-
tively correlated with 
bureaucratic quality 
 
Of the structural variables, only CAREER and MERIT perform consistently well 
as variables to account for cross-country differences in bureaucratic quality. Each coeffi-
cient is large and significant at the 99 per cent level of confidence, indicating that the 
presence of a professional civil service is associated with high skills and efficiency. SAL-
Only professionalism 
accounts for cross-
country differences in 
bureaucratic quality 
across the board 
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 ARY, the legal remuneration of high public officials relative to their counterparts in the 
private sector, is statistically significant only in the QUALITY2 regressions.  
 
EXAM is significant only in the QUALITY2 equation, and only when profes-
sionalism in the civil service is measured by MERIT rather than CAREER. This reflects 
in part a strong co-linearity between EXAM and CAREER, but, more importantly, it is a 
consequence of poor measurement. 
 
The original Rauch and Evans Survey question was “Approximately what pro-
portion of the higher officials (those who hold roughly the top 500 positions in the core 
economic agencies) in these agencies enter the civil service via a formal examination sys-
tem?” This was followed by the question “Of those that do not enter via examinations, 
what proportion have university or post-graduate degrees?” The UNU extension of the 
survey to 16 African countries omitted the second question. This is unfortunate, as there 
is no way of knowing, for those 16 countries, the extent to which university graduation 
might be substituting for entrance examinations in the screening of applicants to senior 
civil service posts.  
 
The coefficients of BRIBES and NPM never achieve statistical significance. The 
equation in the last column of table 6 reports a typical result: both coefficients are nega-
tive, but they are small and not significantly different from zero. Neither extra-legal re-
muneration nor new public management has any systematic relationship with the quality 
and efficiency of the public sector, at least not by these measures. 
Bureaucratic quality and 
efficiency is dependent 
on neither tips and 
bribes, nor the inter-
spersion of public and 
private sector careers 
 
An examination of residuals reveals that the results are not driven by “outliers”, 
that is, unusual observations that can have a profound effect on estimated coefficients. 
This is clear from the plot of QUALITY2 against SALARY in scatter plot 4. 
 
What is also clear is that the re-
sidual – the vertical distance from the 
observed rating of QUALITY2 to the 
regression line – tends to be lower the 
larger the value of SALARY. This vio-
lates a basic assumption of the least 
squares model, which is that residual is 
totally random, unrelated to variables in 
the regression.  
 
Violation of this assumption is 
a common problem with cross-country 
regressions, particularly when the sam-
ple contains very dissimilar countries. 
For this reason, all the statistical tests 
reported are based on estimates of stan-
dard errors corrected for heteroskedas-
ticity (non-random variance). 
Scatter plot 4. 
Quality and salary 
 
 
Note: Plot of QUALITY2 
against SALARY in 1990, 
controlling for GDPCAP, 
MERIT and EXAM (45 
countries). 
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 Data on bureaucratic performance are available for an expanded sample of coun-
tries but, regrettably, with little corresponding information on structural characteristics of 
these bureaucracies. In fact, the only structural variable available is MERIT. Table 7 re-
ports the results of regressing QUALITY1 and QUALITY2 on MERIT, controlling for 
per capita income and regional dummies in three cross-sections – 1990, 1999 and 2002 – 
with as many as 121 observations. 
 
Table 7. 
Determinants of bureaucratic quality (ICRG and SCS surveys) 
 
Dependent 
variable 
QUALITY1 
(1990) 
QUALITY1 
(1999) 
QUALITY1 
(2002) 
QUALITY2 
(1990) 
QUALITY2 
(1999) 
QUALITY2 
(2002) 
Intercept -4.326 -2.213 -1.733 -2.373 -6.348 -3.498 
GDPCAP 0.699*** 0.473*** 0.506*** 0.632*** 1.066*** 0.844*** 
 (0.130) (0.074) (0.093) (0.168) (0.139) (0.126) 
MERIT  0.150*** 0.143*** 0.071*** 0.582*** 0.536*** 0.453*** 
 (0.033) (0.023) (0.027) (0.054) (0.043) (0.048) 
AFRICA 0.812*** -0.309** -0.857***  1.031***  
 (0.238) (0.152) (0.294)  (0.306)  
ASIA   -0.610**    
   (0.249)    
LATINAMERICA   -0.872***   -1.179*** 
   (0.275)   (0.441) 
TRANSITION   -0.846***    
   (0.307)    
Observations 97 107 81 121 121 90 
R-squared 0.592 0.695 0.680 0.688 0.758 0.695 
 
Note: GDPCAP is log of GDP per capita (PPP) in 1990 for the 1990 regressions, in 1999 for the other 
four regressions. 
 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. 
 
*** = significantly different from zero at the 99 per cent level of confidence 
** = significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent level of confidence 
 
The coefficients of GDPCAP and MERIT are positive and highly significant in 
all six regressions. The dummy for AFRICA is statistically significant in four of the six 
regressions; its sign is positive in two equations and negative in the other two, so it is 
most likely capturing the effect of omitted structural variables.  
 
In any event, no policy implications should be ascribed to the sign of the coeffi-
cient of the dummy for AFRICA or other regions. The dummies for ASIA, Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean (LATINAMERICA), and transition economies (TRANSITION) 
are significant in the 2002 QUALITY1 regression, and each coefficient has a negative 
sign. The LATINAMERICA dummy is also statistically significant and negative in the 
2002 QUALITY2 regression. 
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 Scatter plot 5. 
Quality and merit 
 
 
Scatter plot 5 contains a typical 
plot for these results: QUALITY2 
against MERIT in 1999 after controlling 
for the effects of GDPCAP and AF-
RICA. The scatter plot shows clearly 
that the findings are not due to the in-
fluence of outliers and that the residual 
tends to be smaller, the larger the value 
of MERIT. 
 
Note: Plot of QUALITY2 against MERIT in 
1999 (121 countries), controlling for GDPCAP 
and AFRICA. 
 
 
Determinants of integrity 
Table 8 reports findings for a second dimension of performance – integrity – us-
ing data for countries included in the UNU/R&E Survey. 
 
Table 8. 
Determinants of bureaucratic integrity (UNU/R&E Survey) 
 
Dependent 
variable 
INTEGRITY1 
(1984-1990) 
INTEGRITY1 
(1984-1990) 
INTEGRITY2 
(1990) 
INTEGRITY2 
(1990) 
INTEGRITY2 
(1990) 
Intercept -4.756 -3.786 -13.122 -10.483 -5.464 
GDPCAP 0.809*** 0.723*** 1.637*** 1.310*** 0.892** 
 (0.147) (0.180) (0.391) (0.383) (0.356) 
CAREER 1.285**  1.836   
 (0.611)  (1.936)   
MERIT  0.114**  0.382*** 0.397*** 
  (0.054)  (0.150) (0.133) 
SALARY 0.354*** 0.368** 1.217*** 1.160*** 0.782** 
 (0.115) (0.151) (0.394) (0.337) (0.372) 
BRIBES     -0.846** 
     (0.347) 
Observations 50 44 45 45 45 
R-squared 0.515 0.492 0.408 0.490 0.550 
 
Note: GDPCAP is log of GDP per capita (PPP) in 1980. The coefficient of BRIBES is significantly nega-
tive in all equations; the variable is omitted because it is related by definition to measures of INTEG-
RITY, thus not a true “explanatory” variable. 
 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. 
 
*** = significantly different from zero at the 99 per cent level of confidence 
** = significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent level of confidence 
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 Neither EXAM nor NPM was statistically significant in any regression nor were 
any of the regional dummies. The coefficient of the control variable (GDPCAP) is large 
and statistically significant in each regression. The coefficient of CAREER is positive as 
expected, but it is statistically significant (at the 95 per cent level) only in the INTEG-
RITY1 regression. The coefficient of MERIT is significant in the INTEGRITY1 and the 
INTEGRITY2 regressions. SALARY performs very well as an explanatory variable; its 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant in all four regression equations. BRIBES 
appears to be a highly significant explanatory variable, but this result is spurious since 
BRIBES in essence is an alternative measure of the absence of integrity. BRIBES is in-
cluded in the last column of table 8 only as an example to show that this does not affect 
the sign or significance of other explanatory variables.  
Professionalism is sig-
nificant in determining 
integrity of the public 
service 
Salaries also explain 
variations in the level of 
integrity 
 
Table 9 reports three regressions for each of the same two measures of integrity 
for a larger sample of countries. 
 
Table 9. 
Determinants of bureaucratic integrity (ICRG and SCS surveys) 
 
Dependent vari-
able 
INTEGRITY1 
(1990) 
INTEGRITY1 
(1999) 
INTEGRITY1 
(2002) 
INTEGRITY2 
(1990) 
INTEGRITY2 
(1999) 
INTEGRITY2 
(2002) 
Intercept 1.852 1.322 -1.017 -2.743 -7.478 -9.294 
GDPCAP 0.251* 0.189 0.411*** 0.576*** 1.030*** 1.377*** 
 (0.150) (0.128) (0.077) (0.220) (0.202) (0.230) 
MERIT 0.116*** 0.141*** 0.108*** 0.679*** 0.692*** 0.463*** 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.024) (0.076) (0.061) (0.068) 
AFRICA -0.856** -0.730***   0.958** 1.160** 
 (0.384) (0.244)   (0.445) (0.547) 
ASIA -1.667*** -0.492** -0.949***   -0.909* 
 (0.309) (0.234) (0.207)   (0.547) 
LATINAMERICA -1.329***  -0.551**    
 (0.375)  (0.220)    
TRANSITION   -0.732***    
   (0.211)    
Observations 97 107 81 121 121 90 
R-squared 0.501 0.355 0.576 0.576 0.712 0.601 
 
Note: GDPCAP is log of GDP per capita (PPP) in 1990 for the 1990 regressions, in 1999 for the other 
four regressions. 
 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. 
 
*** = significantly different from zero at the 99 per cent level of confidence 
** = significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent level of confidence 
* = significantly different from zero at the 90 per cent level of confidence 
 
The large sample is revealing, but it is important to note that all structural vari-
ables except one are missing from these equations, the exception being MERIT. It is un-
fortunate that it is not possible to test or control for the effects of SALARY in these 
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 equations. The coefficient of GDPCAP in all regressions is positive, as expected, but it is 
barely significant at the 90 per cent level of confidence in the INTEGRITY1 (1990) re-
gression, and only at the 85 per cent level in the INTEGRITY1 (1999) regression. This is 
owing to inclusion of regional dummies, which pick up some of the effects of differences 
in per capita income. With all dummy variables removed (not shown), the size of the co-
efficient on GDPCAP increases and becomes significant at the 99 per cent level of con-
fidence. In the four other equations, GDPCAP is highly significant with or without inclu-
sion of regional dummies. The dummy for Africa is significant in four equations with two 
positive and two negative signs, a finding that is difficult to interpret and that most likely 
is spurious. The dummy for Asia is also significant in four of the six equations, but it has 
a consistently negative coefficient. The dummy for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LATINAMERICA) is significant with a negative sign in two regressions. The dummy 
for transition economies (TRANSITION) is significant in one regression, with a negative 
sign.  
 
From a policy perspective, the most important finding of the regressions re-
ported in table 9 is the consistently positive coefficient for MERIT even controlling for 
the effects of per capita income. In each equation, the coefficient is large and different 
from zero at the 99 per cent level of confidence. This is convincing evidence that a pro-
fessional state bureaucracy follows higher ethical standards than bureaucracies that base 
recruitment and promotion on nepotism and patronage. This finding is robust and is not 
a product of the influence of outliers, as is evident from the plot in scatter plot 7 of a 
typical relationship, INTEGITY2 (1999) against MERIT, controlling for GDPCAP and 
AFRICA. Scatter plot 6 shows a typical scatter diagram from one of the regressions of 
table 8, that of INTEGRITY2 against SALARY in 1990, controlling for GDPCAP and 
MERIT. 
A professional state 
bureaucracy follows 
higher ethical standards 
 
Scatter plot 6. 
Integrity and salary 
 
 
 
Note: Plot of INTEGRITY2 against SALARY in 
1990 (45 countries), controlling for GDPCAP 
and MERIT. 
 
Scatter plot 7. 
Integrity and merit 
 
 
 
Note: Plot of INTEGRITY2 against MERIT in 
1999 (121 countries), controlling for GDPCAP 
and AFRICA. 
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 Prestige of a public sector career 
Many governments face difficulties in hiring and retaining well-educated civil 
servants, a problem that is often associated with low prestige of public service.7 Some 
governments find the task of recruitment more difficult than others. What accounts for 
this inter-country variation in the attractiveness of a career in civil service? 
What accounts for inter-
country variation in the 
attractiveness of a ca-
reer in the civil service? 
 
The last two questions of the UNU/R&E Survey (Q19 and Q20 – see annex) 
provide information that can be used to address this question. The survey questions dealt 
with attractiveness of a public sector career to graduates of elite universities and to mem-
bers of the educated middle class who were not able to attend elite schools. 
 
The responses to the two questions were quite different. In fact, there is little 
correlation between the two. (The correlation coefficient, r, which takes a value of 0 
when there is no correlation and unity when two series are perfectly correlated, has a 
value of only 0.112.) In other words, knowledge of how a country scores on question 19 
or question 20 provides no indication about how it scores on the other question. 
 
Question 19 proved more useful than question 20 for statistical analysis, but the 
sum of responses to the two questions proved even more useful, so these are the results 
reported here. Nonetheless, similar conclusions can be reached using only responses to 
question 20 or (especially) question 19. 
 
The dependent variable for the regression equations, labelled PRESTIGE, is the 
average of responses to survey questions 19 and 20, recoded so that a higher value is as-
sociated with greater attractiveness of a career in the public sector (table 10). The median 
(mid-point) value of this variable is 2.3, and its range is from 1 to 4. 
 
Table 10. 
Measuring the prestige of a public service career 
 
Variable Definition Coded Median Survey 
PRESTIGE 
Average score, reversed, of questions 19 
and 20. High scores indicate that university 
graduates consider a public sector career to 
be “the best possible career option”. 
1-4 2.3 
UNU/ 
R&E 
DEGREE 
Score for question 5 of the original survey, 
limited to 35 countries. High scores indicate 
that a large proportion of senior civil ser-
vants who enter without writing an exam 
possess a university degree. 
1-4 3.33 
UNU/ 
R&E 
 
Detailed results of the regression analysis are reported in table 11. For the full 
sample, the only significant variables are GDPCAP (negative coefficient), NPM (positive 
coefficient) and the AFRICA dummy (negative coefficient). Removing the AFRICA 
dummy from the equation lowers the coefficient of determination (R-squared) and af-
fects the size, but not the statistical significance, of the other explanatory variables.  
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 Splitting the sample into two parts – Africa and non-Africa – reveals profound 
differences. The equation fits very poorly the 23 African countries, with coefficients sig-
nificant at the 90 per cent level of confidence only for GDPCAP and NPM. 
 
In contrast, for the rest of the world (28 mainly developing countries), the coef-
ficients of GDPCAP and NPM are significant at the 99 per cent level, and coefficients of 
two additional explanatory variables (SALARY and BRIBES) are statistically significant at 
the 95 per cent level of confidence.  
 
The negative coefficient for 
GDPCAP in both sets of countries is 
evidence that a career in the public sec-
tor is more attractive the lower the per 
capita income of a country, presumably 
because low-income countries offer 
fewer opportunities for employment in 
their underdeveloped private sectors.  
 
The negative coefficient on NPM sug-
gests that, after controlling for effects of 
other variables, public sectors run by the 
rules of new public management are less 
attractive to recent university graduates 
(see also scatter plot 8). 
 
For non-African countries only, 
the coefficient of SALARY is signifi-
cantly positive and that of BRIBES is 
negative. This indicates, as expected, 
that higher salaries increase the attrac-
tion of public service employment and  
Scatter plot 8. 
Prestige and NPM 
 
 
For non-African coun-
tries, the attractiveness 
of a career in the public 
service suffers from 
bribes, … 
 
Note: Plot of PRESTIGE against NPM in 1970-
1990 (51 countries), controlling for GDPCAP, 
SALARY, BRIBES and AFRICA. 
… and benefits from 
adequate remuneration, 
… 
that reliance on income from extra-legal tips and bribes decreases the attractiveness of a 
career in public service. 
 
The significant, positive coefficient of SALARY for 28 non-African countries 
contrasts with a coefficient close to zero for 23 African countries. It is clear from scatter 
plots 9 and 10 that this result is not driven by outliers. These scatter diagrams plot PRES-
TIGE against SALARY, controlling for the effects of GDPCAP, NPM and BRIBES. 
 
… yet for African coun-
tries, adequate remu-
neration does not im-
prove the prestige of 
public service career, … 
PRESTIGE clearly increases with SALARY for the non-African sample, whereas 
in the African sample, there is no apparent relationship between the two variables. It is 
puzzling that legal remuneration has no effect on the attractiveness of public sector em-
ployment in the African countries of this sample. The analysis offers no explanation for 
the finding. 
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Scatter plot 9. 
Prestige and salary (non Africa) 
 
 
 
Note: Plot of PRESTIGE against SALARY in 
1970-1990 (28 non-African countries), control-
ling for GDPCAP, NPM and BRIBES. 
 
Scatter plot 10. 
Prestige and salary (Africa) 
 
 
 
Note: Plot of PRESTIGE against SALARY in 
1970-1990 (23 African countries), controlling 
for GDPCAP, NPM and BRIBES 
 
 
Even more surprising and disturbing is the finding that the level of BRIBES has 
no effect on the attractiveness of employment in the civil service in African countries. 
Other things equal, high levels of extra-legal payments would be expected to impact 
negatively on the attractiveness of a career in the public sector, at least for university 
graduates with high ethical standards. 
… and bribes are not a 
deterrent in seeking a 
career in the public ser-
vice 
 
None of the responses to other questions in the UNU/R&E Survey were sig-
nificant determinants of PRESTIGE, neither in regressions using data for all countries 
nor in separate regressions for the non-African and African groups.  
 
The lack of significance for EXAM is unexpected since one would expect re-
cruitment by merit to enhance the prestige and attraction of a civil service career for uni-
versity graduates. A possible reason for this result is that data on another, related variable 
is missing for the 16 African countries surveyed by the UNU. This variable is question 5 
(see “:Survey questions and codings”): the proportion of entrants into high levels of the 
civil service without examination who hold a graduate or post-graduate university degree.  
 
This variable is available for the original Rauch and Evans sample of 7 African 
and 28 non-African countries. It is labelled DEGREE in table 11 and is scored from 1 
(less than 30 per cent) to 4 (more than 90 per cent). The median score for the 35 coun-
tries is a high 3.33. 
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 Table 11. 
Determinants of the prestige of a public service career 
 
 
Full sample Africa 
Rest of 
world 
Original 
sample 
Constant 6.368 5.460 4.868 7.958 7.310 
GDPCAP -0.342*** -0.245*** -0.223* -0.572*** -0.406*** 
 (0.099) (0.096) (0.113) (0.124) (0.122) 
SALARY 0.072 0.013 -0.010 0.351** 0.370*** 
 (0.087) (0.086) (0.081) (0.159) (0.127) 
BRIBES -0.058 -0.089 -0.051 -0.175** -0.169** 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.063) (0.081) (0.084) 
EXAM     0.213*** 
     (0.079) 
DEGREE     -0.377*** 
     (0.144) 
NPM -0.488*** -0.438*** -0.303* -0.502*** -0.505*** 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.165) (0.098) (0.079) 
AFRICA  -0.364**     
 (0.182)     
Observa-
tions 
51 51 23 28 35 
R-squared 0.475 0.422 0.241 0.708 0.748 
 
Note: The dependent variable is PRESTIGE. GDPCAP is log of GDP per capita (PPP) in 1980.  
 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. 
 
*** = significantly different from zero at the 99 per cent level of confidence 
** = significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent level of confidence 
* = significantly different from zero at the 90 per cent level of confidence 
 
Addition of DEGREE to the regression equation does, indeed, transform the 
coefficient of EXAM into one that is statistically significant at the 99 per cent level of 
confidence. Other things (including DEGREE) being equal, the existence of entrance 
examinations enhances the prestige and attraction of a career in public service. 
The existence of en-
trance examinations 
enhances the prestige of 
a career in the public 
service  
The coefficient of DEGREE is also highly significant, but its sign is negative. 
Given the independent effect of EXAM, a higher proportion of university graduates 
among those who enter the civil service without writing an examination makes a civil 
service career less attractive to university graduates. This seems counter-intuitive at first 
glance, but on reflection, it is understandable that university graduates might prefer a 
work environment where the university educated are few in number, which makes their 
credentials more valuable and visible. 
Civil service career is less 
attractive where many 
graduates enter without an 
examination 
 
It is important to emphasize that this negative effect of DEGREE is only true 
controlling for EXAM, since countries that require examinations of a large proportion of 
candidates to the civil service also tend to require university degrees of those who bypass 
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 the examination system. (The correlation between EXAM and DEGREE is positive and 
statistically significant, with r = 0.61.) 
 
 
Promotion of civil servants 
to high-level political posts 
The PRESTIGE regressions looked at factors that influence the attractiveness to 
university graduates of a civil service career. The regressions in this section measure the at-
tractiveness to politicians of civil servants for placement in high-level political posts. The 
dependent variable is PROMOTION, the probability that high-level political appointees 
are chosen from the ranks of the civil service (table 12). 
 
Table 12. 
Measuring the propensity to promote civil servants to high-level political posts 
 
Variable Definition Coded Median Survey 
PROMOTION 
Score for question 7: “Of political 
appointees to these [high] posi-
tions, what proportion are likely to 
already be members of the higher 
civil service?” 
1-3 2.0 
UNU/ 
R&E 
 
In the regressions, only one control variable (GDPCAP) and three structural 
variables (BRIBES, EXAM, NPM) were statistically significant in any sample at the 90 
per cent level or higher (see table 13). Of these negative results, perhaps the most surpris-
ing was SALARY, the response to question 4 of the R&E Survey (legal remuneration of 
high-level public sector officials compared with their counterparts in the private sector). 
One might expect high salaries to result in easier recruitment of talented persons, hence 
greater promotion from the ranks of the civil service to higher political posts. This was 
not evident for this sample of 51 countries. The second column of table 13 reports the 
regression results for the full sample of 51 countries. 
 
Two of the explanatory variables – EXAM and NPM – are statistically signifi-
cant at the 99 per cent level. The coefficient of EXAM is positive and that of NPM (new 
public management) is negative. This is a clear indication that a traditional, career-
oriented, merit-driven civil service is attractive to politicians as a source of candidates for 
placement in high-level political posts. 
A career-oriented, merit-
driven civil service is 
attractive to politicians 
as a source of candi-
dates for placement in 
high-level political posts  
An analysis of the residuals of this equation reveals that one country – Botswana 
– is an outlier that has a high propensity to promote civil servants to political posts 
(PROMOTION=3) but has the characteristics of a country expected to exhibit a low 
level of promotion from the ranks of civil servants. Removing Botswana from the sample 
causes the coefficient of BRIBES to become significant, but only at the 90 per cent level 
of confidence and with a positive rather than the expected negative sign. The coefficient 
of GDPCAP has the expected negative sign (politicians in high-income countries have 
access to more private sector talent), but it is small and not statistically significant. 
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 Table 13 also reports the regression results for three sub-samples: non-Africa (28 
countries), Africa (23 countries) and Africa without Botswana (22 countries). The regres-
sion for the non-African sample, made up largely of developing countries from Asia and 
Latin America, is quite good and easily understood. Each of the four coefficients has the 
expected sign and is significant at the 95 per cent level of confidence or better. For the 
African sub-sample, however, only the coefficient of BRIBES is significant (at the 95 per 
cent level), and its sign is positive rather than negative. Removing an outlier (Botswana) 
from the sample causes the positive coefficient of BRIBES to increase in both size and 
significance, and the positive coefficient of EXAM becomes significant at the 90 per cent 
level of confidence. 
 
Table13. 
Determinants of promotion of civil servants to high-level political posts 
 
 
Full 
sample 
Full sample 
less outlier 
Non-Africa Africa 
Africa less 
outlier 
Constant 2.940 2.646 4.234 2.003 2.359 
GDPCAP -0.115 -0.105 -0.208** -0.059 -0.120 
 (0.109) (0.113) (0.090) (0.229) (0.228) 
BRIBES 0.137 0.170* -0.168** 0.247** 0.284*** 
 (0.095) (0.093) (0.077) (0.098) (0.099) 
EXAM 0.305*** 0.345*** 0.289*** 0.161 0.214* 
 (0.081) (0.073) (0.096) (0.134) (0.125) 
NPM -0.278*** -0.254** -0.359** 0.006 -0.045 
 (0.102) (0.101) (0.139) (0.179) (0.199) 
Observations 51 50 28 23 22 
R-squared 0.424 0.493 0.741 0.322 0.464 
 
Notes:  
The dependent variable is PROMOTION. The outlier that was removed in two regressions is Bot-
swana GDPCAP is log of GDP per capita (PPP) in 1980. 
 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. 
 
*** = significantly different from zero at the 99 per cent level of confidence 
** = significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent level of confidence 
* = significantly different from zero at the 90 per cent level of confidence 
 
The dichotomy between African and non-African countries with respect to the 
effect of BRIBES on PROMOTION is astounding. In the non-African sample of coun-
tries, extra-legal income received by high-level public officials diminishes the probability 
that they will be appointed to political posts. In the 23 African countries, the effect of 
BRIBES is precisely the opposite: politicians’ attraction to civil servants and corruption 
in senior ranks of the civil service go hand in hand. 
In non-African countries, 
bribes received by sen-
ior officials diminishes 
the probability that they 
will be appointed to 
political posts, … 
 
As can be seen from scatter plots 11 and 12, this finding is not the result of out-
liers. In fact, the measure of income from tips and bribes is very crude. Some of the 
many “zero” observations might well be positive if the measures were finer, and the dis-
… whereas the opposite 
holds true for African 
countries 
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 tribution of observations up and down the zero axis makes it difficult, indeed, to produce 
a significant slope for the relationship between BRIBES and PROMOTION. 
 
Scatter plot 11. 
Promotion and bribes (non Africa) 
 
 
 
Note: Plot of PROMOTION against BRIBES in 
1970-1990 (28 non-African countries), control-
ling for GDPCAP, NPM and EXAM. 
Scatter plot 12. 
Promotion and bribes (Africa) 
 
 
 
Note: Plot of PROMOTION against BRIBES in 
1970-1990 (22 African countries), controlling 
for GDPCAP, NPM and BRIBES 
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 Survey questions and coding 
 
 
United Nations University/Rauch and Evans Survey 
Rauch and Evans8 surveyed international expert opinion for 35 developing countries. The 
number of expert survey respondents was between three and five for each country, except Morocco, 
Thailand and Uruguay, where two experts responded (table 15). 
 
The United Nations University (UNU), with the help of the African Economic Research 
Consortium (AERC), surveyed an additional 16 African countries and included many of the same, or 
similar, questions as those in the earlier Rauch and Evans questionnaire. The number of expert sur-
vey respondents was between four and six (table 16). In addition, UNU surveyed Eritrea but did not 
report the results. It also surveyed three countries already included by Rauch and Evans (Kenya, Ni-
geria and Tunisia). Both surveys refer to the period 1970-1990.  
 
A major difference between the two surveys is that Rauch and Evans relied largely on inter-
national experts and always on persons with no vested interest in the bureaucracy of the country ex-
amined, whereas UNU-AERC used exclusively local experts, nearly always high-ranking civil servants 
or civil servants who had recently retired.9 The number of possible responses to each question varies, 
but in no case is it greater than five. UNU scaled all responses to a number between 0 and 10. This 
scaling has been reversed in order to combine the two surveys.  
 
The following questions were drafted by Rauch and Evans. Changes in wording made in the 
UNU survey, where important, are noted after each question. Average responses, by country, are 
reported in table 15. 
 
Q4: EXAM 
Question 4 
Approximately what proportion of the higher officials (those who hold roughly the top 500 
positions in the core economic agencies) in these agencies enter the civil service via a for-
mal examination system? 
Answers Less than 30% 30-60% 60-90% More than 90% 
Codes 1 2 3 4 
 
Q5: DEGREE 
Question 5 
Of those that do not enter via examinations, what proportion has university or post-
graduate degrees? 
Answers Less than 30% 30-60% 60-90% More than 90% 
Codes 1 2 3 4 
 
Note: 
The UNU survey did not include this question. Instead, it asked a very different question: “Of those that do enter via examinations, 
what proportion have university or post-graduate degrees?” Therefore, the coding for this question is not reported for UNU coun-
tries in tables 15 and 16. 
 
Q6: CAREER (1) 
Question 6 
Roughly how many of the top levels in these agencies are political appointees (e.g., ap-
pointed by the President or Chief Executive)? 
Answers None Just agency chiefs 
Agency chiefs and 
vice-chiefs 
All of top 2 or 3 
levels 
Codes 1 2 3 4 
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 Q7: CAREER (2) and PROMOTION 
Question 7 
Of political appointees to these [top political] positions, what proportion is likely to already 
be members of the higher civil service? 
Answers Less than 30% 30-70% More than 70% 
Codes 1 2 3 
 
Q8: CAREER (3) 
Question 8 
Of those promoted to the top 2 or 3 levels in these agencies (whether or not they are politi-
cal appointees), what proportion come from within the agency itself (or its associated minis-
try(ies) if the agency is not itself a ministry)? 
Answers Less than 50% 50-70% 70-90% Over 90% 
Codes 1 2 3 4 
 
Q10: CAREER (4) 
Question 10 
What is roughly the modal number of years spent by a typical higher-level official in one of 
these agencies during his career? 
Answers 1-5 years 5-10 years 10-20 years Entire career 
Codes 1 2 3 4 
 
Q11: CAREER (5) 
Question 11 
What prospects for promotion can someone who enters one of these agencies through a 
higher civil service examination early in his/her career reasonably expect? Assuming that 
there are at least a half dozen steps or levels between an entry-level position and the head 
of the agency, how would you characterize the possibilities for moving up in the agency? 
[NB. more than one may apply.] 
Proposition 
1) In most cases, will 
move up one or two 
levels but no more. 
2) In most cases, will 
move up three or 
four levels, but 
unlikely to reach the 
level just below 
political appointees. 
3) If performance is 
superior, moving up 
several levels to the 
level just below 
political appointees 
is not an unreason-
able expectation. 
4) In at least a few 
cases, could expect 
to move up several 
levels within the civil 
service and then 
move up to the very 
top of the agency on 
the basis of political 
appointments. 
Answers If 3 and/or 4 are circled, but not 1 and not 2 Otherwise 
Codes 2 1 
 
Q12: NPM (1) 
Question 12 
How common is it for higher officials in these agencies to spend substantial proportions of 
their careers in the private sector, interspersing private and public sector activity? 
Answers Normal Frequent but not modal Unusual Almost never 
Codes 1 2 3 4 
 
Q13: NPM (2) 
Question 13 
How common is it for higher officials in these agencies to have significant post-retirement 
careers in the private sector? 
Answers Normal Frequent but not modal Unusual Almost never 
Codes 1 2 3 4 
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Q14: SALARY and BRIBES (1) 
Question 14 
How would you estimate the salaries (and perquisites, not including bribes or other extra-
legal sources of income) of higher officials in these agencies relative to those of private sec-
tor managers with roughly comparable training and responsibilities? 
Answers Less than 50% 50-80% 80-90% Comparable Higher 
Codes 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Note: 
The UNU survey asked this question in two parts: base salary, then legal perquisites. The coding reported for UNU countries in 
tables 15 and 16 is an estimate of the sum of the two. 
 
Q15: BRIBES (2) 
Question 15 If bribes and other extra-legal perquisites are included what would the proportion be? 
Answers Less than 50% 50-80% 80-90% Comparable Higher 
Codes 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Note: 
The UNU survey asked this question in three parts: base salary, legal fringe benefits, then tips and bribes. The coding reported for 
UNU countries in tables 15 and 16 is an estimate of the sum of the three parts. 
 
Q19: PRESTIGE (1) 
Question 19 
Among graduates of the country's most elite university/ies, is a public sector career consid-
ered: 
Answers 
The best 
possible ca-
reer option 
The best possible option for 
those whose families are not 
already owners of substantial 
private enterprises 
The best option for 
those who are risk 
averse 
Definitely a second 
best option relative 
to a private sector 
career 
Codes 1 2 3 4 
 
Q20: PRESTIGE (2) 
Question 20 
Among members of the educated middle class who are not in a position to attend the most 
elite universities is a public sector career considered: 
Answers 
The best 
possible ca-
reer option 
The best possible option for 
those whose families are not 
already owners of substantial 
private enterprises 
The best option for 
those who are risk 
averse 
Definitely a second 
best option relative 
to a private sector 
career 
Codes 1 2 3 4 
 
 
State Capacity Survey 
The State Capacity Survey, which was 
part of the Political Instability Task Force 
Project, was conducted in the years 1990, 
1999 and 2002.10 The respondents (table 14) 
are experts with extensive knowledge of the 
politics of one or more countries. All are resi-
dents of the United States and none are em-
ployees of the Government of the United 
States. 
Table 14. 
State Capacity Survey responses 
 
 1990 1999 2002 
Countries 129 129 97 
Respondents 369 369 225 
 
Of the 32 questions in the survey, five are of interest for the present report.11 For each ques-
tion, experts were asked to select an answer ranging from categories such as “very well suited” to 
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 "seriously deficient”. Besides the option of “Don’t know”, each question had three to four possible 
answers. All answers were then converted to a scale from 0 to 10, from “worst” to “best”. The five 
questions are: 
 
Q13: QUALITY2 (1) 
Question 13 
Rate the administrative and technical skills of the country’s civil service (occupying middle 
and higher management roles) 
Answers 
Very well suited to 
the task of govern-
ing 
Adequate to the 
task of govern-
ing 
Somewhat defi-
cient for the task 
of governing 
Seriously deficient 
for the task of gov-
erning 
Don’t 
know 
 
Q16: QUALITY2 (2) 
Question 16 Rate the efficiency of the country’s national bureaucracies overall. 
Answers 
Efficient: most as-
signed tasks imple-
mented effectively 
(e.g., tasks are for the 
most part completed 
on time and within 
budget) 
Adequate: 
some imple-
mentation 
difficulties 
but no major 
problems 
Problematic: 
frequent 
difficulties in 
implement-
ing assigned 
tasks 
Crisis: most tasks not 
implemented effec-
tively (in addition to 
overruns and delays, 
some vital tasks not 
getting done) 
Don’t 
know 
 
Q17: QUALITY2 (3) 
Question 17 
Rate the administrative and technical skills of the country’s civil service (occupying middle 
and higher management roles) 
Answers 
Efficient: most as-
signed tasks imple-
mented effectively 
(e.g., tasks are for the 
most part completed 
on time and within 
budget) 
Adequate: 
some imple-
mentation 
difficulties 
but no major 
problems 
Problematic: 
frequent 
difficulties in 
implement-
ing assigned 
tasks 
Crisis: most tasks not 
implemented effec-
tively (in addition to 
overruns and delays, 
some vital tasks not 
getting done) 
Don’t 
know 
 
Q14: MERIT) 
Question 14 By what criteria are civil servants in government agencies hired, promoted, and replaced? 
Answers 
Consistently professional 
criteria, based on train-
ing, expertise, and per-
formance 
Mostly professional crite-
ria, based on training, 
expertise, and perform-
ance 
Mostly other criteria, 
including personal, ideo-
logical, patronage con-
siderations, etc. 
Don’t 
know 
 
Q15: INTEGRITY2 
Question 15 Rate the severity of overall corruption within the state. 
Answers Low Modest Severe Don’t know 
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Technical data 
 
 
Table 15. 
Responses for 51 countries (UNU/R&E Survey data) 
 
Country Survey N Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q19 Q20 
Argentina R&E 3 1.00 3.00 2.67 1.00 1.00 1.33 1.67 1.50 1.67 1.00 3.33 4.00 3.33 
Botswana UNU 5 1.00 .. 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.50 2.00 4.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 
Brazil R&E 4 1.75 3.75 3.75 2.13 2.00 1.50 1.25 1.75 1.88 2.50 2.58 2.83 2.83 
Cameroon UNU 5 3.00 .. 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 
Chile R&E 4 1.75 3.50 3.25 1.50 1.25 1.67 1.50 1.75 1.75 1.50 1.67 3.25 2.75 
Colombia R&E 4 1.00 3.00 3.25 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 1.75 3.25 3.00 
Costa Rica R&E 3 2.00 3.33 4.00 2.00 1.33 3.00 1.50 2.00 1.33 2.67 2.67 2.50 3.00 
Côte d'Ivoire R&E 3 2.00 3.00 3.67 3.00 3.00 2.67 1.67 2.33 3.00 2.00 4.75 2.00 2.33 
Dominican Republic R&E 5 1.00 1.60 3.60 1.00 1.00 1.30 1.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.50 4.00 3.40 
Ecuador R&E 3 1.00 3.33 3.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.50 1.33 1.33 1.33 2.00 4.00 4.00 
Egypt R&E 3 1.33 3.33 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.83 1.00 3.33 1.83 1.33 2.00 2.60 2.77 
Ghana UNU 4 4.00 .. 3.00 3.00 2.50 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 4.00 1.50 
Greece R&E 5 2.60 3.60 3.00 1.60 2.60 2.80 1.60 3.40 2.80 1.40 1.75 3.30 1.70 
Guatemala R&E 4 1.00 3.00 3.50 1.00 1.50 2.27 1.67 1.38 1.13 1.33 2.67 3.50 3.25 
Haiti R&E 4 1.00 1.25 3.75 1.50 1.00 1.43 1.50 1.25 1.25 2.25 3.88 2.25 2.00 
Hong Konga R&E 3 3.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 1.90 1.67 1.33 4.00 2.00 3.33 3.33 3.00 3.00 
India R&E 3 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 2.33 1.00 2.00 4.00 1.67 1.33 3.00 1.50 1.33 
Israel R&E 3 3.33 3.67 3.50 2.50 2.67 2.50 1.67 2.33 1.50 1.50 1.75 3.50 3.50 
Kenya R&E 3 1.00 3.33 2.83 2.33 2.00 2.33 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.17 4.00 3.67 4.00 
Malawi UNU 4 1.00 .. 4.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 1.00 
Malaysia R&E 3 3.00 3.33 2.17 1.50 2.33 2.67 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 2.67 3.17 2.50 
Mali UNU 6 4.00 .. 2.50 3.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.50 3.50 5.00 3.00 2.00 
Mauritius UNU 5 1.00 .. 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 
Mexico R&E 4 1.00 3.75 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.33 2.00 3.50 2.50 3.00 5.00 2.50 2.83 
Morocco R&E 2 2.50 2.50 4.00 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.50 3.50 3.00 2.50 
Mozambique UNU 4 1.00 .. 3.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.50 2.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 3.50 1.00 
Namibia UNU 6 3.00 .. 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.50 3.00 2.00 4.50 4.50 3.00 4.00 
Niger UNU 4 2.00 .. 4.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.50 1.00 5.00 3.50 2.50 
Nigeria R&E 3 2.33 2.67 3.50 2.00 1.93 1.67 1.33 1.67 1.33 1.00 3.00 3.17 2.17 
Pakistan R&E 3 3.00 3.00 3.33 2.50 2.00 3.33 1.67 3.33 2.33 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.67 
Peru R&E 5 1.00 3.20 3.60 1.40 1.60 1.80 1.75 2.25 1.75 1.75 2.75 3.50 2.25 
Philippines R&E 4 2.25 3.75 3.00 1.25 1.50 1.25 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.88 3.93 4.00 2.50 
Portugal R&E 4 2.00 3.75 3.00 2.25 2.75 3.38 1.25 2.75 2.75 1.50 2.00 3.75 2.25 
Republic of Korea R&E 3 2.67 3.67 3.00 2.67 3.00 2.67 2.00 3.33 1.67 2.33 3.33 2.00 3.67 
Senegal UNU 4 2.50 .. 2.25 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 5.00 4.00 1.50 
Singapore R&E 4 3.33 3.75 2.00 2.33 2.33 2.75 2.00 3.25 2.68 3.75 3.75 1.30 1.33 
South Africa UNU 4 1.00 .. 4.00 2.00 1.00 1.70 2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 
Spain R&E 5 3.80 3.80 3.40 3.00 3.40 2.90 1.80 3.00 2.40 1.70 1.67 2.80 2.60 
Sri Lanka R&E 5 3.20 3.80 2.30 2.80 3.00 3.00 1.60 3.60 2.80 1.60 2.90 2.70 1.88 
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Country (con’t) Survey N Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q19 Q20 
Syrian Arab Republic R&E 4 1.00 2.67 3.50 1.67 2.00 3.27 1.00 3.33 1.67 1.00 3.17 3.25 3.00 
Taiwan Province of 
China 
R&E 4 3.75 4.00 3.13 2.75 3.50 3.50 1.75 3.50 3.00 2.13 2.67 2.38 2.13 
Thailand R&E 2 3.00 4.00 1.50 3.00 3.00 3.75 1.50 2.75 2.50 1.50 2.00 1.25 3.00 
Togo UNU 4 1.00 .. 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 5.00 3.00 2.00 
Tunisia R&E 5 3.25 4.00 2.50 2.25 3.00 1.63 1.60 2.80 2.00 1.70 1.67 3.13 2.25 
Turkey R&E 4 3.25 4.00 2.75 2.00 2.75 3.25 2.00 2.75 2.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 3.25 
Uganda UNU 5 3.00 .. 4.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 3.00 2.00 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
UNU 5 3.00 .. 4.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 
Uruguay R&E 2 2.00 3.00 3.25 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.50 1.00 1.50 1.50 3.50 3.00 
Zaireb R&E 3 1.00 2.00 3.67 1.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.33 3.00 1.67 4.33 2.50 1.00 
Zambia UNU 4 1.00 .. 4.00 1.00 1.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.50 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.50 
Zimbabwe UNU 4 1.00 .. 4.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.50 4.00 4.50 3.50 1.50 
 
Notes:  
N = Expert responses to survey questions. Two dots (..) signify data not available. 
 
a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China as of 1 July 1997. 
b Democratic Republic of the Congo as of 17 May 1997. 
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Table 16. 
Regression variables for 51 countries (UNU/R&E Survey data) 
 
Country 
GDPCAP 
(1980) 
QUALITY1 QUALITY2 
INTEG-
RITY1 
INTEG-
RITY2 
PRESTIGE 
PROMO-
TION 
CAREER MERIT SALARY BRIBES EXAM NPM 
Argentina              9.27 2.00 3.33 3.95 0.83 1.33 1.00 0.24 1.67 1.00 2.33 1.00 3.42
Botswana              8.14 3.00 6.66 4.19 9.17 2.50 3.00 0.83 6.67 3.00 0.00 1.00 2.50
Brazil              8.76 3.00 3.89 3.92 2.08 2.17 2.13 0.28 1.00 2.50 0.08 1.75 3.19
Cameroon              7.66 2.92 3.89 2.14 0.00 2.50 3.00 0.60 5.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00
Chile              8.60 2.08 7.77 3.05 10.00 2.00 1.50 0.26 0.00 1.50 0.17 1.75 3.25
Colombia              8.37 3.00 3.89 3.00 1.25 1.88 1.25 0.13 2.50 1.75 0.00 1.00 3.63
Costa Rica              8.60 2.00 5.83 5.00 7.50 2.25 2.00 0.36 7.50 2.67 0.00 2.00 3.33
Côte d'Ivoire 7.83 3.00 5.55           2.89 2.50 2.83 3.00 0.60 5.12 2.00 2.75 2.00 2.33
Dominican Republic              7.98 2.00 .. 3.00 .. 1.30 1.00 0.09 .. 1.00 2.50 1.00 4.00
Ecuador            8.35 2.00 5.55 3.00 5.00 1.00 1.33 0.22 0.00 1.33 0.67 1.00 3.67
Egypt              7.79 1.86 3.78 1.95 4.50 2.32 2.00 0.42 3.00 1.33 0.67 1.33 2.42
Ghana              7.09 1.23 4.81 2.51 4.17 2.25 3.00 0.63 3.33 3.00 2.00 4.00 2.50
Greece              9.38 2.02 .. 4.21 .. 2.50 1.60 0.47 .. 1.40 0.35 2.60 1.90
Guatemala              8.31 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.63 1.00 0.28 0.00 1.33 1.33 1.00 3.75
Haiti              7.01 0.00 1.33 0.69 1.50 2.88 1.50 0.20 0.83 2.25 1.63 1.00 3.75
Hong Konga              9.44 2.71 .. 5.00 .. 2.00 2.00 0.40 .. 3.33 0.00 3.00 2.00
India           7.06 2.92 5.55 2.81 2.12 3.58 3.00 0.56 5.00 1.33 1.67 4.00 2.17
Israel              9.34 2.99 6.22 5.00 5.63 1.50 2.50 0.53 5.00 1.50 0.25 3.33 3.08
Kenya              7.12 2.77 4.07 2.86 0.00 1.17 2.33 0.37 1.67 1.17 2.83 1.00 3.00
Malawi              6.48 1.00 5.00 4.00 0.00 2.50 3.00 0.53 0.00 5.00 0.00 1.00 2.50
Malaysia              8.49 2.55 4.44 4.33 5.00 2.17 1.50 0.57 0.00 2.00 0.67 3.00 3.00
Mali              6.85 0.00 2.78 1.21 2.50 2.50 3.00 0.63 0.00 3.50 1.50 4.00 2.75
Mauritius              8.66 .. 7.77 .. 5.00 2.00 1.00 0.40 5.00 3.00 0.00 1.00 2.50
Mexico            8.94 1.65 2.96 3.00 1.67 2.33 2.00 0.52 0.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.00
Morocco              8.00 2.38 3.33 2.43 0.00 2.25 2.50 0.55 0.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00
Mozambique              7.03 2.00 2.41 4.00 7.50 2.75 2.00 0.37 0.00 5.00 0.00 1.00 3.50
Namibia            8.39 2.00 8.52 3.00 9.17 1.50 1.00 0.17 5.00 4.50 0.00 3.00 2.50
Niger              7.03 3.00 3.33 3.93 2.50 2.00 3.00 0.53 5.00 1.00 4.00 2.00 3.25
Nigeria            7.10 1.17 2.06 1.95 0.00 2.33 2.00 0.31 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.33 3.50
Pakistan              7.05 1.89 0.00 1.86 0.00 3.17 2.50 0.55 0.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.17
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Country (con’t) 
GDPCAP 
(1980) 
QUALITY1 QUALITY2 
INTEG-
RITY1 
INTEG-
RITY2 
PRESTIGE 
PROMO-
TION 
CAREER MERIT SALARY BRIBES EXAM NPM 
Peru              8.50 1.00 1.66 2.95 1.25 2.13 1.40 0.31 1.25 1.75 1.00 1.00 3.00
Philippines              8.10 0.48 3.33 1.38 2.50 1.75 1.25 0.29 0.00 1.88 2.05 2.25 3.63
Portugal              9.11 2.01 6.80 4.38 7.50 2.00 2.25 0.52 7.08 1.50 0.50 2.00 2.25
Republic of Korea              8.47 3.02 7.22 2.12 3.75 2.17 2.67 0.68 5.00 2.33 1.00 2.67 2.50
Senegal              7.29 2.00 4.44 3.00 1.67 2.25 2.50 0.60 3.33 2.00 3.00 2.50 2.00
Singapore            9.35 3.50 10.00 5.29 10.00 3.68 2.33 0.67 5.00 3.75 0.00 3.33 2.04
South Africa 8.98 4.00 3.91 5.48          4.58 2.50 2.00 0.35 0.00 4.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Spain           9.35 3.00 7.50 4.07 6.25 2.30 3.00 0.69 7.50 1.67 0.00 3.80 2.30
Sri Lanka              7.49 2.00 5.74 3.00 4.58 2.71 2.80 0.68 1.67 1.60 1.30 3.20 1.80
Syrian Arab 
Republic 8.00             0.92 2.78 1.92 0.63 1.88 1.67 0.32 0.00 1.00 2.17 1.00 2.50
Taiwan Province of 
China 8.68             3.07 6.66 4.00 4.38 2.75 2.75 0.72 5.00 2.13 0.54 3.75 1.75
Thailand            7.91 3.13 6.11 3.00 2.50 2.88 3.00 0.78 5.00 1.50 0.50 3.00 2.38
Togo              7.23 1.00 .. 2.00 .. 2.50 3.00 0.47 .. 1.00 4.00 1.00 2.00
Tunisia              8.38 2.00 5.18 3.00 5.00 2.31 2.25 0.52 0.00 1.67 0.00 3.25 2.60
Turkey           8.36 2.00 4.16 2.73 0.63 1.38 2.00 0.65 1.25 1.00 1.00 3.25 2.63
Uganda              6.09 0.00 2.94 2.13 4.17 2.50 2.00 0.43 3.33 4.00 1.00 3.00 2.50
United Republic of 
Tanzania 6.41             0.00 0.00 3.18 0.00 2.50 2.00 0.43 0.00 2.00 0.00 3.00 2.00
Uruguay              8.99 1.00 .. 3.00 .. 1.75 2.00 0.55 .. 1.50 0.00 2.00 3.75
Zaireb              6.58 0.75 1.33 0.00 0.00 3.25 1.67 0.09 0.00 1.67 2.67 1.00 1.83
Zambia              7.12 0.92 1.06 1.92 2.50 2.75 1.00 0.23 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.00 2.25
Zimbabwe              7.88 2.51 .. 2.99 .. 2.50 1.00 0.33 .. 4.00 0.50 1.00 2.25
 
Notes:  
GDPCAP is in logs, calculated from purchasing power parity GDP data in Heston, A., R. Summers and B. Aten (2002). Penn World Table Version 6.1. Center for International Comparisons at the 
University. Two dots (..) signify data not available. 
 
a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China as of 1 July 1997. 
b Democratic Republic of the Congo as of 17 May 1997. 
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